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COINTELPRO. COINTELPRO is the acronym for a domestic counterintelligence program operated from 1956 to
1971 by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and coordinated by the Domestic Intelligence Division. This program was initially devised to disrupt and neutralize the
Communist Party of the United States through an aggressive campaign of covert operations. Beginning in the mid1960s the FBI director, J. Edgar Hoovc1~ expanded the
scope of COINTELPRO to "counteract domestic terrorism
and conduct investigations of individuals and organizations who threatened terroristic violence" (Federal Bureau
of Investigation). The FBI justified the deployment ol the
draconian COINTELPRO operations to prevent Communist infiltration of "legal mass organizations" but primarilY
of domestic groups that dissented from government policY.
COINTELPRO employed illegal and legal covert measures
to "neutralize" and destroy organizations that the FBI identified as a threat to national security. A Senate committee
that investigated COINTELPRO reached a radically different conclusion regarding the targets and tactics of the FBI.
The committee found that "covert action programs have
been used to disrupt the lawful political activities of individual Americans and groups and to discredit them, using
dangerous and degrading tactics which are abhorrent in a
free and decent society" (U.S. Senate). Over two thousand
known COINTELPRO operations were launched against
Communists and an array of domestic political organizations and social movements created and led by African
Americans, Native Americans, and Latinas and Latinos. A
small number of these operations were launched against
white supremacists (primarily the Ku Klux Klan). The FBI
unilaterally determined whether any domestic political organizations posed a threat to national security and if so
whether to authorize COINTELPRO operations.
COINTELPRO, the FBI, and the Chicano/a Movement
The black liberation movement, the Puerto Rican independence movement, and the American Indian Movement (AIM) were singled out for particularly aggressive
intrusion. The FBI records that have been released do not
indicate the extent to which official COINTELPRO operations were deployed against Chicano and Chicana organizations. Yet the history of the most prominent and
militant groups of the Chicano/a movement of the 1960s
and 1970s is marked by a svstematic campaign of intimidation and disruption by FBI operatives. In fact the vast
majority of if not all prominent Chicano and Chicana civil
rights and political organizations were subject to FBI surveillance. COINTELPRO operations were directed primarily against those organizations that advocated militant
cultural nationalism and national liberation. All the Chicano/a associations targeted by the FBI were legitimate

COINTELPRO
political organizations. Some were committed to socialjustice goals through community-building campaigns,
others to anti-Vietnam War activities, and others to nonelectoral paramilitary but legal political protest to affect
public policy. The Chicano/a groups targeted by the FBI
included but were not limited to La Raza Unida Party,
Centro de Acci6n Social Aut6noma, the Brown Berets, the
Crusade for Social Justice, the Chicano National Moratorium, and the United Farm Workers (UFW). The FBI
identified some of these legitimate organizations as potential threats to national security and applied the draconian, unconstitutional methods it used in its domestic
counterinsurgency operations against the Communists.
One of the earliest targets of particularly aggressive
COINTELPRO and police disruption was the Coloradobased Crusade for Social Justice, founded by Rodolfo
"Corky" Gonzales, a charismatic and unusually effective political leader. According to Ernesto Vigil, one of the organization's leaders and its chronicler, the crusade's "rejection of
mainstream politics ... opened the way for a strategy of
militant grassroots organizing and independent political action in which Chicanos would decide their destiny independent of institutions controlled by others" (Vigil, p. 26).
The FBI became alarmed at the crusade's increasingly successful organizing efforts and its growing notoriety as an effective Chicano/a liberation movement as well as at
indications that it was assuming a national leadership role
as a dissident organization. The FBI was ever-vigilant about
the crusade's international connections to Mexican radical
and Communist organizations and to domestic dissident
groups, especially AIM. In order to discredit the crusade, the
FBI tried to link it to Fuerzas Armadas de Liberaci6n Nacional (FALN), the clandestine Puerto Rican revolutionary
organization that was responsible for a series of bombings.
The FBI organized a disinformation campaign that spread
rumors that the crusade and AIM had acquired weapons
and conspired to usc them to "kill a cop a day." Attorneys
who sought to quash subpoenas served on two crusade
members to appear before a federal grand jury investigating
FALN argued that the FBI had a "documented history ... to
generally dissipate and discredit efforts of minority groups
and civil rights organizations as part of their COINTELPRO
program" and that the FBI had "practiced this program
against the Crusade for Justice" (Vigil, p. 354). The crusade
was infiltrated by FBI operatives and subjected to a relentless campaign of intimidation, which included fabricated
charges and the misuse of the judicial process to obtain convictions of the organization's leadership, including Corky
Gonzales. The destruction of the crusade's facilities and continuing legal battles depleted the organization's resources.
FBI-perpetrated factionalism and incarceration of its leadership demoralized and ultimately undermined the crusade.
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The Brown Berets organization (originally the Young
Chicanos for Community Action) was a nonstudent youth
organization at the center of the Chicano/a movement. The
paramilitary Brown Berets were established in 196 7 and
like the Black Panthers formulated a radical nationalist cultural perspective. The Berets called for Chicano and Chicana self-reliance and militant opposition to the public
authorities that were the source of Chicano and Chicana
poverty and oppression. Brown Berets chapters were established nationally, and the organization was pivotal in establishing the National Chicano Moratorium Committee,
which organized marches and activities against the Vietnam War. Its history was marked by confrontation with police authorities and the deaths, injuries, and incarceration
of many of its members. FBI agents infiltrated many of the
local Brown Beret chapters and fomented factionalism and
internal discord, which debilitated the organization. In
1972 David Sanchez, the founder and leader of the Brown
Berets, announced the dissolution of the movement (which
claimed a membership of five thousand in ninety chapters).
He faulted the government for "police harassment and infiltration, internal squabbles ... which ruined discipline"
and could lead to bloodshed (Chavez, p. 57).
Chicano and Chicana organizations that did not adopt
militant cultural nationalism and avoided confrontation
with public authorities were not immune from FBI surveillance and disruption. La Raza Unida Party (RUP) was
another important Chicano and Chicana political organization victimized by FBI counterinsurgency operations,
including infiltration, harassment, burglaries, and so on.
RUP was a legitimate political party that promoted Chicano and Chicana cultural pride and was highly critical of
conservative Mexican American organizations (such as
the League of United Latin American Citizens (LULAC)
and the American G.I. Forum). Although it rejected the
relevance of the existing two-party system, RUP was the
first ethnic-based political party that fielded candidates
for elective office. From the organization's inception in
1970 through its demise in 1981, RUP's leadership was
closely monitored by the FBI.
The Centro de Acci6n Social Aut6noma ( CASA) was
founded by the community activists Bert Corona and
Soledad Alatorre in Los Angeles as "a voluntary, democratic mutual assistance social welfare organization" to
provide service to undocumented Mexican workers
(Gutierrez, p. 190). By 1975, with a membership in the
thousands, it adopted a Marxist-Leninist philosophy and
called for international labor unity among the Chicano
and Chicana working class and workers in Mexico to organize against multinational corporations. The corporations, CASA told its followers, were responsible for the
impoverishment of Latina and Latino workers throughout
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the hemisphere. The FBI viewed CASA with increased
concern, given its growing membership, militant internationalism, and radical critique of capitalism. CASA was infiltrated on the grounds that its activities could violate
federal statutes prohibiting seditious conspiracy and advocating the overthrow of the government.
COINTELPRO also initiated illegal infiltration and surveillance of the United Farm Workers Union and its
foundct~ Cesar Chavez, beginning in 1965. The UFW,
which was locked in a battle for survival with California
growers, was infiltrated by FBI agents, who generated
field reports to discredit the organization and sought to
link it with Mexican Communist organizations. The FBI
shared information with the growers and purposefully
failed to investigate the criminal actions of the growers
against the union and its impoverished members. The aggressive and extensive covert actions of the FBI and police authorities against dissident Chicano/a organizations
severely weakened the vibrant Chicano/a Movement and
made its dream or achieving social justice for this portion
of the American population elusive.

The FBI and Puerto Rican Independence and
New Left Organizations
The FBI has monitored the political activities of Puerto
Rican communities in New York and Chicago, ever-vigilant to possible links between independence organizations in Puerto Rico and their sympathizers in the United
States. After the 1954 Nationalist Party attack on the U.S.
House of Representatives, 250 FBI agents arrested 91 Nationalists in New York. The San Juan FBI office was ordered in 1960 to "exchange ideas relative to tactics and
techniques" with the New York bureau "because of the
large number of Puerto Ricans residing in New York" and
"the fact that" independence organizations were active in
the cit~ (Churchill and Wall, p. 71). COINTELPRO targeted the Young Lords and effectively infiltrated the organization and destroyed it by promoting irreconcilable
factionalism. The Young Lords member Iris Morales
wrote: "Police agents within the organization worked to
intensifv the differences and natural contradictions that
existed among us. Intimidation tactics and beatings silenced opposition." In Chicago, FBI agents blocked and
destabilized alliances that were developing between the
Black Panther Party and the Young Lords. The Chicago
COINTELPRO agent monitored the emerging coalition
between the Panthers and the Lords and "would submit
appropriate counterintelligence suggestions" (Wolf).
Although the FBI had been involved in Puerto Rico since
at least I 936, when it investigated the Nationalist Party, in
1960 Hoover expressed alam1 that a resurgent independence movement on the island would establish links with the
socialist Cuban government. Speaking before the General

Assembly of the United Nations on September 28, 1960,
both Fidel Castro, president of Cuba, and Nikita
Khrushchev, leader of the Soviet Union, condemned the
United States for the "crime of colonialism" and listed
Puerio Rico among the colonized nations of the world. The
resurgence in the mid- to late 1950s of organizations committed to Puerto Rican independence was of particular concern lo the FBI. Among the most prominent of these
organizations, all built in the wake of the virtual eradication of the radical Nationalist Party, were the Puerto Rican
Pro-Independence Movement (MPJ); the Federation of ProIndependence University Students (FUPI), a renewed militant Puerio Rican Socialist Pariy; and Acci6n Patriotica
Unitaria. The FBI seemed convinced that these organizations, which subscribed variously to socialist or MarxistLeninist philosophies and were avowedly critical of U.S.
colonialism or were sympathetic to the Cuban socialist
regime, would resurrect the militant Nationalist Party campaign for Puerto Rican independence.
It is in the context of the rapid consolidation of the
Cuban Revolution, the growing internationalization of
Puerto Rico's political status, and what Socialist Party president Juan Mari Bras called the "dawn of new stmggle for
independence" (Silen, p. 429) that the FBI began COINTELPRO operations in Puetio Rico to wage an aggressive
campaign to eviscerate and render ineffective these independence organizations. In August 1960 Hoover authorized
agents in Puerto Rico to underiake a clandestine campaign
to "distupt the activities" of organizations seeking independence "through other than lawful, peaceful means" and
informed them that he was "not interested in mere harassment" (Churchill and Wall, p. 68). Puerto Rico was a high
priori tv arena for COINTELPRO operations. The FBI either
worked closely or shared information with the Puerto
Rican police (which had its own Intelligence Division), U.S.
military intelligence, and the Central Intelligence Agency.
Bv the end of 1962 the FBI expanded its covert action
campaign to infiltrate and disrupt the operations of virtually all groups advocating independence, irrespective of
whether they advocated peaceful means to achieve this
goal. The MPI and FUPI, neither of which advocated the
use of violence to attain independence, were the first organizations targeted by COINTELPRO operatives. In 1966
Hoover testified that at least nine proindcpendence organizations that were seen as a continuous problem for U.S.
internal security "were under investigation" (MerrillRamirez, p. 260). Mari Bras was a frequent target of harassment and persecution given his centrality to the
independence cause and his international stature as an opponent of U.S. colonialism. The COINTELPRO goal was lo
destroy the independence organizations because their actions were drawing world attention to Puerto Rico's colonial situation and in the process eroding the legitimacy of
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the U.S.-supported Popular Democratic Party that govemed the island.
The FBI planted informers and agent provocateurs in a
number of organizations to create discord and confusion
among independentistas. FBI operatives tried to discredit
the movement by linking it with "Communist Cuba," hoping that this would encourage defections. FBI operatives
employed blatant tactics of intimidation and misused the
police and judicial powers of the Puerto Rican govemment. According to Ruben Berrios, president of the Puerto
Rican Independence Party, COINTELPRO waged "a
frontal attack on an entire movement and an entire set of
ideals. It is virtually an act of war upon our people's will,
determination and rights" (Churchill and Wall, p. 88).
The FBI's long history of violating the civil rights of
Puerto Ricans came to light in congressional testimony by
Director Louis Freeh, who conceded that the agency had
undertaken "egregious illegal action, maybe criminal action .... Particularly in the 1960s, the FBI did operate a
program that did tremendous destruction to many people"
(Gonzalez). After the suspension of COINTELPRO, the FBI
remained deeply involved in combating legitimate independence organizations, which, despite evidence to the
contrary, were portrayed as potentially violent revolutionary groups. Throughout the 1970s the independence movement was subjected to a virtual campaign of terrorism that
included bombings of Independence Party and Socialist
Party headquarters. Mari Bras's son was murdered in 1976.
Two young independentistas were murdered in Cerro Maravilla in 1978, provoking a legislative inquiry and accusations that the FBI attempted to obstruct the investigations.
According to the reporter and writer Alfred Lopez, during
a fifteen-year period ( 1971 to 1986) over 170 attacks of various types committed against independence movement organizations were documented. The FBI and local police
were singularly incapable of investigating the cases and arresting any suspects. In December 1999 Puerto Rican governor Pedro Rossello revealed that the Police Intelligence
Division in a "corrupt practice" had compiled secret
dossiers (carpetas) on scores of thousands of Puerto Ricans, the vast majority of whom were independence sympathizers. The FBI provided assistance and, reportedly,
actual training to local police authorities on surveillance
techniques and directed police agents in conducting these
clandestine operations.
A long-standing campaign of state-sponsored repression
against proindependence organizations and the virtual
criminalization of individuals sympathetic to independence help explain the dramatic decline in popular support
for self-determination in Puerto Rico during the last half
of the twentieth century. Proponents of Puerto Rican independence have paid a high price for their belief that
their country is a colony.
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See also Brown Berets; Chicano/a Movement;
Gonzales, Rodolfo Corky; Mari Bras, Juan; Puerto Ricans; and Young Lords Party.
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COLON, JESUS (1901-1974), writer. Jesus Colon was
born into a working-class family in Cayey, Puerto Rico. At
age sixteen he moved to New York, where he worked in a
variety of jobs, including "washing dishes, working on the
docks, or at the many odd jobs in innumerable factories
and shops" (Colon 1993, p. 37). His wide range of jobs allowed him to witness the exploitation and abuse suffered
by lower-class and unskilled laborers. Although Colon finished high school in New York and attended two years of
college, he was primarily a self-taught individual, a tireless
reader, and a collector of books and other written material, such as pamphlets, invitations, newsletters, leaflets,
and periodical articles. He became increasingly aware of
social, political, and economic issues as he ventured
deeper into Anglo-American society.
In 1923 Colon began to publish articles in several
New York newspapers, such as Justicia, Gnifico, Pueblos

